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SARA B. THOMAS 
State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #5867 
 
BEN P. MCGREEVY 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #8712 
P.O. Box 2816 




IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,   ) 
     )  NOS. 42810, 42811, 42812, 42813 & 42814 
 Plaintiff-Respondent, )  
     )  BONNEVILLE COUNTY NOS. 
v.     ) CR 2012-18985, CR 2013-1265, 
     ) CR 2013-15367, CR 2013-15369 
JEREMY ORVILLE JOHNSON, ) & CR 2013-15370 
     )  
 Defendant-Appellant. )  APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
___________________________) 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Pursuant to a plea agreement, Jeremy Orville Johnson pleaded guilty to felony 
injury to jail, and the district court imposed a unified sentence of three years, with one 
year fixed.  In a second case, Mr. Johnson pleaded guilty to felony possession of a 
controlled substance, and the district court imposed a concurrent unified sentence of 
seven years, with two years fixed.  The district court suspended the sentences in both 
cases and placed Mr. Johnson on probation for a period of five years. 
 Later, in a third case, Mr. Johnson pleaded guilty to felony delivery of a controlled 
substance—methamphetamine.  In two more felony delivery of a controlled substance—
methamphetamine cases, Mr. Johnson entered into a binding plea agreement and 
 2 
pleaded guilty.  The district court revoked probation in the first and second cases and 
executed the sentences.  In the third, fourth, and fifth cases, the district court followed 
the parties’ joint sentencing request from the binding plea agreement and imposed 
concurrent unified sentences of twenty-five years, with eight years fixed.   
 Mr. Johnson filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (“Rule 35”) motion for a reduction of 
sentence in each of the five cases.  The district court denied the Rule 35 motions.  
Mr. Johnson appealed in all five cases, asserting in his consolidated appeal the district 
court abused its discretion when it denied his Rule 35 motions. 
 In its Respondent’s Brief, the State argued the district court lost jurisdiction to 
rule on Mr. Johnson’s Rule 35 motions, Mr. Johnson’s claim is barred by the doctrine of 
invited error, and Mr. Johnson did not establish any basis for reversal of the district 
court’s denial of his Rule 35 motions because he did not present any new evidence in 
support of the motions.  (Resp. Br., pp.2-6.) 
 This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State’s arguments, which 
are unavailing. 
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in 
Mr. Johnson’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 






Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Johnson’s Idaho Criminal 




The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Johnson’s Idaho Criminal 
Rule 35 Motions For A Reduction Of Sentence  
 
Mr. Johnson asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his 
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motions for a reduction of sentence, because his sentences are 
excessive in view of the new and additional information presented with his Rule 35 
motions.  Specifically, Mr. Johnson presented new and additional information on his 
desire to participate in a “rider” and provide financial support for his ailing father.  (See 
Nos. 42810, 42811, 42812, 42813, & 42814 Tr., Mar. 30, 2015 (hereinafter, Rule 35 
Tr.), p.7, L.3 – p.14, L.13.) 
 
A. The District Court Acted Within A Reasonable Time In Ruling On The 
Rule 35 Motions 
 
The State argues Mr. Johnson’s Rule 35 motions were not timely ruled upon, 
because the district court lost jurisdiction, due to the passage of time, to rule on the 
motions.  (Resp. Br., pp.2-3.)  However, the district court here acted within a reasonable 
time in ruling on the Rule 35 motions and therefore had jurisdiction. 
Under Rule 35, a district court “may reduce a sentence within 120 days after the 
filing of a judgment of conviction,” and “may also reduce a sentence upon revocation of 
probation or upon motion made within fourteen (14) days after the filing of the order 
revoking probation.”  I.C.R. 35(b).  However, the Idaho Supreme Court has held “a 
district court does not lose jurisdiction to act upon a timely motion under Rule 35 merely 
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because the 120-day period expires before the judge reasonably can consider and act 
upon the motion.”  State v. Chapman, 121 Idaho 351, 354 (1992) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Rather, “if the trial court does not rule upon the Rule 35 motion within a 
reasonable time after the expiration of the 120-day period, the trial court loses 
jurisdiction.”  Id.   
The Idaho Court of Appeals has held “[t]he reasonableness of any delay by the 
district court in ruling upon a Rule 35 motion must be evaluated in light of the purposes 
supporting the 120-day limitation and reasons for the trial court’s delay in each case.”  
State v. Tranmer, 135 Idaho 614, 616 (Ct. App. 2001).  “The 120-day limitation serves 
two purposes:  it protects judges from repeated pleas by those sentenced and it 
ensures ‘that the court does not usurp the responsibilities of the parole officials by 
acting on the motion in light of the movant’s conduct while in prison.’”  Id. (quoting State 
v. Simpson, 131 Idaho 196, 197-98 (Ct. App. 1998)) (emphasis in original).  In another 
case, the Court of Appeals held that “when a defendant files Rule 35 motion, it will of 
necessity become defense counsel’s responsibility to precipitate action on the motion 
within a reasonable time frame, or otherwise provide an adequate record and 
justification for delay, to avoid the risk of the trial court losing jurisdiction to consider the 
motion.”  State v. Day, 131 Idaho 184, 186 (Ct. App. 1998). 
Here, Mr. Johnson has provided “an adequate record and justification for [the] 
delay.”  See id.  The State acknowledges Mr. Johnson filed “timely Rule 35 motions” 
(Resp. Br., p.2), and further notes Mr. Johnson filed the motions seven days after the 
entry of the judgments of conviction and orders revoking probation.  (Resp. Br., p.3.)  
The State also observes “[t]he delay in ruling on the motions in this case was 175 days, 
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161 days more than the original 14-day deadline for filing the motions timely from the 
orders revoking probation and 55 days more than the original 120-day deadline for filing 
the motions timely from the judgments of conviction.”  (Resp. Br., p.3.) 
The State then contends “the court had no jurisdiction at the time of the hearing 
on the motions, held 181 days after the entry of the judgments and orders revoking 
probation.”  (Resp. Br., p.3.)  In support of that contention, the State argues “nothing in 
the record justifies such a lengthy delay.”  (Resp. Br., p.3.)  The State is incorrect.  The 
record actually shows the district court initially scheduled a hearing on the Rule 35 
motions for 34 days after the entry of the judgments and orders revoking probation.  
(See, e.g., R., p.618.)1  However, the parties stipulated to continue the hearing because 
the prosecutor and investigating detective would be “unavailable due to previously 
scheduled training.”  (See, e.g., R., pp.342-46.)  The district court, “[b]ased upon the 
Motion of the State,” then rescheduled the Rule 35 motions hearing.  (E.g., R., p.618.) 
The district court continued the Rule 35 motions hearing several more times, 
before vacating the hearing.  (See, e.g., R., pp.12-13 (register of actions for 
No. 42810).)  The district court later set a new date for a Rule 35 motions hearing, and 
subsequently continued that hearing.  (See, e.g., R., p.13.)  When the district court 
finally conducted a hearing, Mr. Johnson’s counsel advised the district court that 
Mr. Johnson wanted counsel to withdraw because counsel had prosecuted 
Mr. Johnson’s father years ago and Mr. Johnson claimed a conflict of interest.  (E.g., 
R., p.626.)  The district court allowed defense counsel to withdraw, appointed conflict 
                                            
1 The “E.g.” and “See, e.g.,” signals throughout this brief generally indicate the cited 
documents were filed in all five cases in this consolidated appeal.  For example, the 
district court’s Orders to Continue, filed on October 30, 2014 in all five cases, may be 
found on pages 117, 236, 347, 482, and 618 of the record. 
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counsel to represent Mr. Johnson, and rescheduled the Rule 35 motions hearing.  (E.g., 
R., p.626.) 
The parties then filed a Joint Stipulation to Continue the Rule 35 motions hearing 
from the rescheduled date, “for reason that the Defendant’s counsel has been recently 
appointed and needs additional time to receive the Defendant’s file.  Further, 
Defendant’s counsel has a conflicting hearing in Fremont County, Idaho.”  (E.g., 
R., p.630.)  The parties thus jointly stipulated to reschedule the hearing.  (E.g., 
R., p.630.)  The district court ordered the hearing be continued as the parties stipulated.  
(E.g., R., p.628.) 
Thus, there is ample support in the record here for the delay.  The district court 
would have conducted a hearing on the Rule 35 motions as early as 34 days after the 
entry of the judgments and orders revoking probation, but the parties stipulated to a 
continuance based upon the State’s prosecutor and investigating detective being 
unavailable.  (See, e.g., R., p.618.)   The district court later continued the hearing 
several more times.  (See, e.g., R., pp.12-13.)  When a hearing finally took place, the 
district court continued the Rule 35 motions hearing after allowing defense counsel to 
withdraw for a claimed conflict of interest with Mr. Johnson.  (See, e.g., R., p.626.)  The 
parties then stipulated to another continuance, this time because newly-appointed 
counsel for Mr. Johnson needed additional time to receive the file and had a conflicting 
hearing.  (See, e.g., R., p.630.)  Based on the specific facts of this case, the district 
court acted within a reasonable time in ruling on Mr. Johnson’s Rule 35 motions and 
therefore had jurisdiction at the time of the hearing on the motions.  See State v. 
Veloquio, 141 Idaho 154, 156 (Ct. App. 2005) (holding a seven-month delay between 
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the entry of a judgment of conviction and the district court’s ruling on a Rule 35 motion 
was reasonable, based on the specific facts of that case).2 
 
B. The Invited Error Doctrine Does Not Apply, Because Mr. Johnson Did Not Invite 
The District Court To Deny His Rule 35 Motions 
 
 The State argues Mr. Johnson’s claim on appeal is barred by the doctrine of 
invited error.  (See Resp. Br., p.4.)  More specifically, the State contends that because 
Mr. Johnson “stipulated to the sentences he received in case numbers 42812, 42813, 
and 42814 and to the revocation of probation and execution of his underlying sentences 
in case numbers 42810 and 42811, he cannot claim on appeal that the district court 
abused its discretion by following the plea agreement or that the district court abused its 
discretion by declining to reduce his sentences.”  (Resp. Br., pp.4-5.)  The State’s 
argument on this point ignores the fact that Mr. Johnson has not challenged the district 
court’s initial sentencing and probation revocation decisions, but rather he has 
challenged the district court’s denial of his Rule 35 motions.  Mr. Johnson did not invite 
the district court to deny his Rule 35 motions.  Thus, the invited error doctrine does 
not apply. 
 Under the invited error doctrine, “one may not successfully complain of errors 
one has acquiesced in or invited.  Errors consented to, acquiesced in, or invited are not 
reversible.”  State v. Owsley, 105 Idaho 836, 838 (1983) (citation omitted).  The invited 
                                            
2 Considering the State stipulated to at least two of the district court’s periods of delay in 
ruling on the Rule 35 motions (see, e.g., R., pp.618, 626), the doctrine of judicial 
estoppel should bar the State from arguing an incompatible position on appeal.  See 
Hoagland v. Ada County, 154 Idaho 900, 912 (2005) (“Judicial estoppel precludes a 
party from advantageously taking one position, then subsequently seeking a second 
position that is incompatible with first.”). 
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error doctrine “applies to sentencing decisions as well as rulings made during trial.”  
State v. Edghill, 155 Idaho 846, 849 (Ct. App. 2014). 
 Here, Mr. Johnson did not invite the district court to deny his Rule 35 motions.  
Mr. Johnson did not assert in his Rule 35 motions that the district court’s initial 
sentencing and probation revocation decisions were erroneous at the time the district 
court made those decisions.  (See, e.g., R., p.605.)  Nor did Mr. Johnson challenge the 
district court’s initial sentencing and probation revocation decisions on appeal.  (See 
generally App. Br.)  Rather, Mr. Johnson asserted at the Rule 35 motions hearing that 
the sentences were excessive in light of the new and additional evidence presented with 
the Rule 35 motions.  (See Rule 35 Tr., p.15, Ls.8-13.)  Mr. Johnson did not consent to, 
acquiesce in, or invite the district court’s denial of the Rule 35 motions.  (See generally 
Rule 35 Tr.)  Because Mr. Johnson did not invite the district court to deny his Rule 35 
motions, the invited error doctrine does not apply.  Cf. Edghill, 155 Idaho at 849-50 
(holding the invited error doctrine did not apply because the specific relief the defendant 
sought was not what was granted by the district court). 
 
C. Mr. Johnson Presented New And Additional Information In Support Of The 
Rule 35 Motions 
 
The State argues that, “because [Mr.] Johnson presented no new evidence in 
support of his Rule 35 motions, he failed to demonstrate in the motions that his 
sentences were excessive.  Having failed to make such a showing, he has failed to 
establish any basis for reversal of the district court’s orders denying his Rule 35 
motions.”  (Resp. Br., pp.4-5.)  However, Mr. Johnson actually presented new and 
additional information in support of the Rule 35 motions. 
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The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “[w]hen presenting a Rule 35 motion, 
the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional 
information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion.”  
State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007).  “An appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 
motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review the underlying sentence absent the 
presentation of new information.”  Id. 
In this case, Mr. Johnson presented new and additional information in support of 
his Rule 35 motions.  Mr. Johnson presented new and additional information on his 
desire to participate in a “rider” and provide financial support for his ailing father.  (See 
Rule 35 Tr., p.7, L.3 – p.14, L.13.)   
The State argues this was not new or additional information, “as information with 
respect to [Mr.] Johnson’s desire to help his ailing father was contained in the PSI and 
[Mr.] Johnson advised the court of his desire to participate in the rider program at the 
time of his sentencing/disposition hearing.”  (Resp. Br., p.5 (citations omitted).)  
However, the portion of the PSI cited by the State only contained information from 
Mr. Johnson that his father was dying and had MS, and that he wanted to “give my dad 
as good and comfortable of a life as I can as he dies.”  (See PSI, p.13.)  The PSI did not 
contain the information presented at the Rule 35 motions hearing that Mr. Johnson’s 
father was getting more and more disabled as time went on, also had severe nerve 
damage in his back, and had been trying to get Social Security Disability benefits for 
three years to no avail.  (See Rule 35 Tr., p.11, L.22 – p.14, L.13.) 
Similarly, while Mr. Johnson expressed his desire to participate in a rider at the 
sentencing and probation violation evidentiary/disposition hearing for all five cases (see, 
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e.g., No. 42810 Tr., p.25, L.25 – p.26, L.7), Mr. Johnson informed the district court at 
the Rule 35 motions hearing he wanted to move away from Idaho after he was 
released.  (Rule 35 Tr., p.7, Ls.3-8.)  Mr. Johnson further testified at the Rule 35 
motions hearing that he responded well to treatment and wanted to interstate compact 
to Tennessee.  (Rule 35 Tr., p.8, Ls.1-13.) 
Thus, contrary to the State’s argument, Mr. Johnson presented new and 
additional information in support of his Rule 35 motions.  Even if the Court were to 
determine the information is not “new,” it would still be “additional” information as 
contemplated by the Idaho Supreme Court in Huffman.  See Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203.  
In view of that new and additional information, Mr. Johnson asserts that his sentences 
are excessive.  Despite the State’s unavailing arguments, Mr. Johnson submits that the 




For the above reasons, as well as the reasons contained in the Appellant’s Brief, 
Mr. Johnson respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentences as it deems 
appropriate.  Alternatively, he requests that this Court vacate the orders denying his 
Rule 35 motions and remand his cases to the district court for further proceedings. 
 DATED this 25th day of April, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      BEN P. MCGREEVY 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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